The almighty save!

[maddash]

If the conventional wisdom about closers is wrong, is there an alternate strategy that would be more effective? Does it make sense to carry one relief ace?

The relief ace is one strategy that I'm amazed hasn't caught on - it almost seems like good closers are so rare that teams don't want to risk messing with how they've always done it (well, "always" meaning since TRL helped change the roll in the 80's). They've had success with sticking to conventional wisdom, so why risk wasting a good closer by changing things. But as Richie pointed out, the conventional wisdom for the closer can be downright silly.

[Michael]

If the conventional wisdom about closers is wrong, is there an alternate strategy that would be more effective? Does it make sense to carry one relief ace?

High leverage game situations or to start the 8 and\or 9th inning in the following situations (in order or importance):

1) Up by one run.
2) Tied.
3) Down by a run.
4) Up by 2 runs.
.
.
.
.

[Jmodene]

FWIW, the modern closer thing really started with Bruce Sutter in the late 1970's, not TLR/Eckersley in the late 1980's - it was with Sutter that the custom of only using your relief ace in save situations first took hold; the feeling up until that point - as far as Sutter went - was that he was pitching too much early in the season, putting up lights-out numbers, and then crashing in the second half. The notion of saving him for saves was designed to get a whole year's worth of excellent performance out of him, and it worked - and it worked for many other relievers as well as more and more relievers began to enjoy long, consistently productive careers (Gossage, Quisenberry, Henke, McGraw, etc.).

What TLR/Eckersley did was to refine the role to the 9th inning only - which many people now think may have gone too far, but Eck was so spectacular in that role that it caught on and became the standard.

We are, today, seeing a bit of a return to the more-than-the-9th role, but generally speaking, only a slight increase from "last 3 outs" to "last 4 outs" with an occasional five-out save. We still aren't seeing too many two- or three-inning saves from the closers yet; we did see a lot of those during Sutter's day.

[GatewaySnayke]

I believe it was BP who found that using your best reliever, which is supposed to be your closer, in a low leverage situation is a waste.

Let's say Isringhausen is the best reliever. If the opponent has runners on the corner with one out in the top of the seventh inning, do you want Brad Thompson, Russ Springer, Josh Hancock or Ryan Franklin brought in, or the BEST, Isringhausen?

Using your best reliever to protect a three-run lead in the ninth inning is just silly, and teams are so used to doing this that we won't see it change for awhile. A team leading by three runs in the bottom of the ninth inning have nearly a 98% chance of winning. Even with a two-run lead a team can expect to win ~94 percent of the time.

[Transmogrified Tiger]

Using your best reliever to protect a three-run lead in the ninth inning is just silly, and teams are so used to doing this that we won't see it change for awhile. A team leading by three runs in the bottom of the ninth inning have nearly a 98% chance of winning. Even with a two-run lead a team can expect to win ~94 percent of the time.

Isn't there an inconsistency in citing those stats for your point? How much lower would those percentages be if the closer was actually used for the highest leverage situation, and not the 9th?

[GatewaySnayke]

Using your best reliever to protect a three-run lead in the ninth inning is just silly, and teams are so used to doing this that we won't see it change for awhile. A team leading by three runs in the bottom of the ninth inning have nearly a 98% chance of winning. Even with a two-run lead a team can expect to win ~94 percent of the time.

Isn't there an inconsistency in citing those stats for your point? How much lower would those percentages be if the closer was actually used for the highest leverage situation, and not the 9th?

I don't know, since I use the Win Expectancy Finder at walkoffbalk and they just use data gathered over the last 30 years.

[jim]

Some good points being brought up to AD's comment. Here is a little mind exercise that imho proves that the use of a closer is not optimal.

Say you have a lights out closer - think of Gagne, Rivera etc.. when they were their best. This closer melts after 1 inning, you simply can't use him more than 1. You are playing the Cardinals, you are up by 1 in the bottom of the 8th (St Louis home), and the Cards are sending up Duncan/Pujols/Rolen followed by Edmonds/Taguchi/Kennedy/Molina/Pitcher/Eckstein...

Your starter is toast, you need to bring a reliever in. Since you know your #1 and some other reliever is going to pitch, why not use your #1 to face the heart of the lineup? Let your other reliever take his chances in the 9th with the bottom of the order. Doesn't it make sense to use your best pitcher to get through the other teams best hitters? Steve gave an example of Francona doing just that this year, I hope he reads this and gives us the date so we can look at the box score. It doesn't surprise me to see Francona do that.

The most important situations in a game often occur well before the ninth inning. Keith Wolner found by looking at leverage indexes that 40% of time time the most critical time of a game happens in the 9th inning. 60% occur in innings 6,7, or 8. He actually creates a model of when to maximize your use of a closer, but it's terribly unrealistic in therms of implementing it in practice. It assumes as soon as that point is reached your guy is ready, and one of the main points I started this thread with was that the act of warming up is not free - there is a cost.

Using a relief ace with a 3 run lead to start the 9th is wasteful. I don't have the exact numbers, but a guy with a 4.50 ERA and a guy with a 1.50 ERA will almost always save that game. I think it's something like 1 extra win in 100 chances using the better reliever.

[Popeye_Card]

If the conventional wisdom about closers is wrong, is there an alternate strategy that would be more effective? Does it make sense to carry one relief ace?

The relief ace is one strategy that I'm amazed hasn't caught on - it almost seems like good closers are so rare that teams don't want to risk messing with how they've always done it (well, "always" meaning since TRL helped change the roll in the 80's). They've had success with sticking to conventional wisdom, so why risk wasting a good closer by changing things. But as Richie pointed out, the conventional wisdom for the closer can be downright silly.

I think Leyland does a good job in Detroit. Zumaya and Rodney are clearly the best relievers in his bullpen, and he deploys them when he needs the key outs in the 6th, 7th, or 8th. People may scratch their heads at why Todd Jones is still the "closer", but I think his system works quite well.

Average leverage index per batter in 2006:

Jones: 1.99
Zumaya: 1.60
Rodney: 1.55

Even with his system in place, the "closer" is seeing the highest average leverage situations.

--P--

[jim]

Here is the game Steve was talking about with Paps coming in to the game in the 8th and not racking up a save:

http://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes ... 4130.shtml

Had he stayed in the game he would have gotten credit, because when he entered it was a save situation. Even though the game got out of hand and the 9th started with Boston winning 10-1, Paps would have gotten the save had he completed it.

[Richie Allen]

The most important situations in a game often occur well before the ninth inning.

Well off the subject but a much higher percentage of golf tournaments are won or lost on the 17th hole on the final day.

I'm not one that whole-heartedly agrees that all outs in baseball are equally tough. I think some hitters have the ability to hone in in late inning situations. Therefore I do think that outs the final time through the order can potentially be more difficult to obtain than earlier in the game (7th-9th innings). In other words, the 7th inning can be just as important, and difficult, as the ninth.