I think I see where the confusion might be. The limit of 1 millisievert per year is the limit for an operation that deals with radiation, for them to get licensed. If I'm understanding correctly, it is saying "the public" (which I'd assume would mean a neighborhood near a nuclear power plant or something) should not be exposed to 1 millisievert just from that operation. It doesn't include background radiation. So it would be 1 millisievert above the background level of radiation.
This page says this (I bolded a couple relevant ones):
0.098 μSv: banana equivalent dose, a whimsical unit of radiation dose representing the measure of radiation from a typical banana[33][a]
0.25 μSv: U.S. limit on effective dose from a single airport security screening[34]
5 to 10 μSv: one set of dental radiographs[35]
80 μSv: average dose to people living within 16 km of Three Mile Island accident[36]
0.4 to 0.6 mSv: two-view mammogram, using weighting factors updated in 2007[37] 1 mSv: The U.S. 10 CFR § 20.1301(a)(1) dose limit for individual members of the public, total effective dose equivalent, per annum[38]
1.5 to 1.7 mSv: annual dose for flight attendants[39]
2 to 7 mSv: barium fluoroscopy, e.g. Barium meal, up to 2 minutes, 4–24 spot images[40]
10 to 30 mSv: single full-body CT scan[41][42]
50 mSv: The U.S. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1201(a)(1)(i) occupational dose limit, total effective dose equivalent, per annum[43] 68 mSv: estimated maximum dose to evacuees who lived closest to the Fukushima I nuclear accidents[44]
80 mSv: 6 months stay on the International Space Station
250 mSv: 6 month trip to Mars - radiation due to cosmic rays, which are very difficult to shield against
500 mSv: The U.S. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1201(a)(2)(ii) occupational dose limit, shallow-dose equivalent to skin, per annum[43] 670 mSv: highest dose received by a worker responding to the Fukushima emergency[45][a]
1 Sv: Maximum allowed radiation exposure for NASA astronauts over their career
4.5 to 6 Sv: fatal acute doses during Goiânia accident
With regard to your first bolded statement, here is the expanded version:
(1) The total effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public from the licensed operation does not exceed 0.1 rem (1 mSv) in a year, exclusive of the dose contributions from background radiation, from any administration the individual has received, from exposure to individuals administered radioactive material and released under § 35.75, from voluntary participation in medical research programs, and from the licensee's disposal of radioactive material into sanitary sewerage in accordance with § 20.2003, and
I think that's talking about something completely irrelevant to this discussion (35.75 talks about medical implants) sanitary sewage, etc. I don't think any of that applies here. It's odd that the wiki link referenced it.
Although it appears to have been written in the months immediately following the Fukushima accident.
This in particular is interesting:
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) has been monitoring emergency workers for external dose throughout the accident and its aftermath. TEPCO has also performed whole-body counting on each worker to derive his or her internal dose. Over the period of time from March 2011 through July 2011, approximately 14,841 TEPCO employees and contractors were monitored. Slight discrepancies in the reported number of workers monitored are due to a handful of individuals where external and internal dose results are not both available.
The standard worker dose limit for Japanese workers is 50 mSv/year and 100 mSv over 5 years. Before the accident, the emergency dose limit was set at 100 mSv/year but was raised to 250 mSv/year to allow workers to respond to this serious accident.
As of the most recent monitoring period, no observable health effects have been reported in any of the workers. It should be noted that acute health effects are not expected at these doses to workers, although all are being closely monitored. For chronic health effects above 0.1 Sv (100 mSv), the cancer risk can be approximated as increasing by 10%/Sv (using the regulatory accepted linear no-threshold dose model used in radiation protection). For example, the occupational worker who received a dose of 0.1 Sv (100 mSv) has a 1% increased risk of developing a cancer later in his or her life. Estimating cancer risks to the general public is complicated by the low dose rates outside of the NPS and significant overall cancer rates from various environmental factors [2].
The maximum external dose recorded is 199 mSv (0.19 Sv), and the maximum internal dose that has been calculated is 590 mSv (0.59 Sv). The maximum total dose recorded to one worker was 670 mSv, and six workers have received doses in excess of the emergency dose limits established. Although 408 workers have received doses above the normal annual limit of 50 mSv, the average dose for emergency workers is still relatively low and has decreased steadily during the months following the accident. For workers performing emergency work since March, the average total accumulated dose is 22.4 mSv. For the months April through July, the average dose is <4 mSv. The total collective dose for all emergency workers is estimated to be 115 person-Sv. In addition to whole-body doses, two male employees received significant skin dose while laying electric cables from standing in contaminated water that flooded their boots. Their estimated skin dose was ~2 to 3 Sv.
The actions in the immediate aftermath of the accident on March 11 resulted in doses to a handful of workers in excess of established limits and elevated doses to a larger group, as noted above. Since that time, TEPCO has been improving the working conditions and safety measures for its workers. All TEPCO workers are required to wear protective clothing, gloves, and protection masks. TEPCO has established contamination-free rest areas throughout the NPS; installed water coolers; and introduced a “cool vest,” which aims to protect workers from heat exhaustion. Currently, seven designated rest areas have been created, and four additional rest areas are in preparation. Also, improvements in living conditions have been made at the gymnasium that houses these workers.
The simple conversion is to take 1 mSv and multiply it by 100 to get the equivalent value in mrem. The standard nuclear worker dose limit in Japan is the same as it is in the US - 5 rem/5000 mrem/50mSv, although I've never heard of the US having a 10 rem over 5 year max allowable dose. I'm not in Maintenance or Operations, so I very rarely ever accrue dose in the plant (in almost 10 years of being a nuclear worker I've only accrued maybe 2-3 mrem total at the site). We have guys who get their hands dirty daily who approach the limit every year - but I'm definitely not one of them.
Based on the total doses recorded, the guy who was hit with 670 mSv (67 rem) would probably be the only one who may suffer radiation sickness. But still, for that, it typically takes at least 100 rems of exposure. There may be slight increases in risks of cancer, as noted above, but I don't foresee it causing a generational problem to the tens of thousands of people in the evacuation zone.
Thanks, that was very informative. I think the point of that paywalled article was really about how it's an invisible thing and it's just kind of hanging over them. It's good to know their health is likely not at risk but it has affected their day to day lives. The hotels are full of TEPCO workers, they can't fish or eat any fish from that area, all the displaced people, checkpoints to go in and out of the forbidden zone, etc...
They just had a special on the Smithsonian channel last night about the tsunami's in Indoneisia & Japan. The destruction of these things is just unreal. What are the chances that both a 9.0 & 9.2 magnitude earthquake happens within a decade, both causing a massive tsunami?
They were saying that the Pacific Northwest is next on the list & there's a 1 in 3 chance that one happens in the next 50 years.
Oh, the destruction is totally crazy. And what happened there was a tragedy. I am absolutely confident in saying that what happened there wouldn't happen in the US. I'm not saying physically - sure, we could get hit with an earthquake and a tsunami on the east or west coast and flood a plant and wipe out our diesel engines and knock out all offsite power and everything else that happened. But the other big failure that occurred was on the regulatory/governmental side of things - those requirements don't exist here in the states.
Operators in the control room could have opened a vent to the reactor building which would have allowed the built-up hydrogen to escape, thereby preventing the hydrogen explosion that destroyed the buildings. However, in order to do it, operators had to get approval from the Japanese equivalent of a state governor. That's a lot of red tape to go through for a snap decision. In the US, the approval to open the vent comes from the Shift Manager inside the control room.
As for the physical side of things, plants are designed for specific accidents in mind - they're called Design Basis Events (DBE). Earthquakes, missile strikes, floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, airplane crashes, etc. The topography/geography is analyzed and taken into consideration so a plant near a fault line is obviously designed to be more seismically rugged than one 1000 miles from the nearest major fault line. One in the middle of a flood plain has more rigor with berm usage than one away from one, etc. What this accident taught the nuclear industry in the US is that there actually can be Beyond Design Basis Events (BDBE), meaning multiple DBEs happening together. In this case - a huge ass earthquake followed immediately by a huge ass tsunami.
One event by itself would not have led to the accident occurring. But together it was possible. So now every plant in the US re-analyzed their DBEs to consider BDBEs and how to mitigate them if they actually occurred. Special "flex" strategies were implemented, with portable pumps/generators/tankers that can be quickly hitched to a truck and driven anywhere on site to provide steady emergency power. Increased battery storage capacity - most plants kept batteries on standby for a full 8 hour charge in the event of a loss of offsite power/diesel failure; now most plants have a 24 hour capacity. Remember that venting "regulatory" problem I mentioned? A lot of sites are installing hardened vents in their containment buildings which, when given a certain set of conditions (such as a buildup of hydrogen), will automatically vent to atmosphere preventing an operator from even needing to get approval from the Shift Manager.
Things like that.
It's terrible that it happened, and I feel sorry for each of the tens of thousands of people who were basically forcibly kicked out of their homes, and are now suffering financial burdens as well. But the one positive that came out of it is the same positive that came out of the Three Mile Island accident and the Chernobyl accident - the nuclear industry learned and evolved to prevent it from happening again somewhere else.
That's the unique thing about the nuclear industry. Every site in the world wants to be the safest site in the world, but also wants every other site in the world to also be the safest in the world. We share information, procedures, analyses, calculations, operating experience, etc. freely with each other. Okay, not wit the communist countries, but the overall point still stands. Can you imagine employees from Ford freely providing design/proprietary test data on their new aluminum frame for the F-150 with Chevy or Dodge? Or the St. Louis Cardinals front office freely and happily providing all of their proprietary research data on pitchers with the Chicago Cubs? The nuclear industry is very unique in that regard. We don't keep stuff hidden, as much as some corporate anti-nuclear bureaucrats want to believe we do.
I agree with swirls. The US nuclear industry reacts to any incident that would affect public safety (as they should). The amount of money spent at the plant I work at as a result of Three Mile Island, 9/11 and Fukushima would blow you away.
The recovery team from Fukushima visited the plant I work at last summer and shared their stories. They had a hard time talking about it even after all the time that had past. They definitely lived a nightmare.